On the eve of the January 14, 2011 revolution, Tunisia was neither an ideal democracy nor the economic “dragon” of the southern Mediterranean that official propaganda portrayed it as. Public and individual freedoms were restricted, clientelism was widespread, development was unequal and unbalanced, and the regime controlled everyday life with an iron grip. The “Tunisian model” was marked by serious imbalances, many of which helped spur the revolution.
Regional and social disparities in the distribution of wealth and opportunities created a growing sense of injustice among large sections of the population. When protests erupted following the mistreatment of a street vendor in Sidi Bouzid by municipal police officers and his subsequent suicide, they developed into a nationwide uprising that ultimately transformed the country’s political, social and economic order. But acknowledging the injustice Tunisians endured before 2011 should not obscure another reality: The state had a cohesive administration, managed an open economy that maintained its main macroeconomic balances to some extent, and provided public services that met citizens’ needs to some degree.
The economy was far from delivering prosperity for all, and its benefits were distributed unfairly. But it remained cohesive and achieved steady growth averaging 4 percent annually during the decade before the revolution. That rate fell by half between 2011 and 2021.
The revolution opened a new chapter, bringing political pluralism, freedom of expression and democratic institutions. But this political transition was not accompanied by an economic one. Governments, coalitions and policies changed without putting the economy on a path towards fair and sustainable growth.
Instead, economic indicators deteriorated, public-finance imbalances worsened and creating wealth and jobs became increasingly difficult. Yet despite this decline and severe difficulties, particularly during COVID-19, Tunisia had not before 2021 reached the point where the state could no longer perform its basic functions or the economy’s fundamental balances were severely disrupted, as happened afterwards. Tunisians are now living through the summer of 2026 amid persistent electricity and water cuts, a collapsed health system unable to provide basic care and essential medicines, and purchasing power at its lowest levels, leaving citizens barely able to obtain basic foodstuffs.
How did Tunisia reach a situation unprecedented in the history of the post-independence state? And how did promises of economic salvation, self-reliance, recovering stolen funds and building a new economic model lead to a reality in which citizens cannot find enough water for themselves and their families? Kais Saied came to power in 2019 at a moment of political exhaustion, after years of conflict among the elites and amid growing economic and social difficulties that had caused many Tunisians to lose confidence in the political class.
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