This week, Moscow will host the third Russia-Africa summit, bringing together African leaders as President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand Russia’s economic, military and political reach across the continent. Yet Russia’s growing influence has done far more to advance Moscow’s interests and protect allied rulers than to deliver the prosperity and security promised to ordinary Africans. Putin is scheduled to cochair Thursday’s plenary session with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the African Union.
Alongside the summit, a two-day economic and humanitarian forum will discuss investment, industrial production, food security, energy, technology and payment systems. Organisers have placed trade and investment at the centre of the programme with a new plan for 2027-2029 expected to advance what they call “mutually beneficial cooperation”. On August 20, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova outlined plans for another substantial round of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts at the Moscow summit.
The Sochi gathering in October 2019 produced 92 agreements, and Putin pledged to double annual trade to $40bn. Four years later, the July 2023 summit in St Petersburg yielded 161 more accords and a 2023-2026 action plan. The economic results have not matched Moscow’s promises.
As the 2023-2026 plan nears its conclusion, Russia’s own trade statistics expose the shortfall: Merchandise trade with Africa reached just $27.1bn in 2025 against Putin’s $40bn target. The trade imbalance persisted into 2026 with Russia exporting $14bn in goods to Africa during the first eight months of the year while importing just $3.2bn. Agricultural exports help explain Africa’s significant trade deficit with Russia.
In the first half of 2026 alone, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to Africa, with Egypt its largest agricultural customer. These supplies meet genuine food security needs, but exports of wheat and fertiliser benefit Russian producers more than they contribute to African industrial development. Russia’s investment record exposes a substantial gap between agreements signed and projects completed.
At the 2019 summit, fertiliser producer Uralchem and Angola’s Grupo Opaia agreed to build a $1.2bn ammonia and urea complex, scheduled to begin production in 2023, but Uralchem abandoned the venture that year. Egypt offers clearer evidence of progress: Rosatom is building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa, where more than 18,000 Egyptians are employed in their construction. But the project is being financed largely through a $25bn Russian loan that Egypt must repay with interest.
Extract — continue reading at the source.
