However, this surge has yet to result in the kind of industrial revolution that many had hoped for. To be sure, the United States is experiencing a genuine boom in AI investment. The hyperscalers accelerated their R&D and capital investment 50-fold over the past two decades to $750 billion in 2025 compared to $15 billion in 2005.
By the end of 2026, total investment by these hyperscalers could approach $1 trillion. But here’s the catch: despite that record level of spending, productive investment as a share of U.S. That measure matters because it tracks spending on the economy’s productive assets—the factories, equipment, infrastructure, and intellectual property that underpin future productivity and competitiveness.
The AI boom is real, but it has yet to reshape investment across the broader industrial economy. This disconnect matters because productive investment is a leading indicator of competitiveness and of where production, jobs, and growth will occur. While the United States has outperformed most advanced economies on investment since the global financial crisis, China is adding roughly $4.4 trillion in net productive assets annually, roughly four times the equivalent amount in the United States.
We estimate that addressing the most critical U.S. import dependencies could require on the order of $2 trillion in additional manufacturing investment or about 6% of GDP. At the end of 2025, investment in factory structures fell 6% after peaking in 2024. Meanwhile, investment in general industrial equipment was essentially flat, although there was a slight uptick in machinery and equipment investment in the first quarter of this year.
The reshoring momentum that started in 2022 has plateaued in the numbers, and any recent announcements will take time to translate into construction and development. One clear challenge to sparking a U.S. industrial renaissance: it’s expensive to make in America. Across most steps of the production process—construction, labor, materials, equipment, and time to market—the United States is a costly place to invest.
Excluding any subsidies, the all-in costs to build products like semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are roughly 40% and 60% higher, respectively, than in the most competitive locations, while the cost of developing a new antibody medicine is 2.7 times as expensive compared to China. Two factors constitute the bulk of the cost gap. The first is more costly and slower capex delivery.
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